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Abstract 
Title: CEO Reputation and Goodwill Impairment Decisions 
Background and problem: Accounting for goodwill has been a problem for a long time, since 
the regulations changed in 2005 the goodwill post has been increasing in size. Since the goodwill 
regulations are based on a lot of subjective decisions it allows managers to manipulate the 
goodwill post to fit their needs. This has resulted in IASB proposing to make changes to the 
regulations affecting goodwill impairments. 
Purpose: This paper aims to examine how CEO reputation affects the CEOs in their decisions 
regarding goodwill impairments, as well as how the tone of the media affect decisions about 
goodwill impairments. 
Scope: The study focuses on public Swedish companies that are listed at NASDAQ Stockholm. 
The reasons for this are so that all of the companies would be Sufficiently mentioned in media 
and that they all follow the same regulations. The study was also limited to the years 2013-2017. 
Research method: The size of the CEOs reputation was measured by the number of articles 
written mentioning the CEO. The tone in media articles about CEOs was measured by using the 
textual analysis program DICTION on English written articles. A multiple regression model was 
used to check for if a relationship exists.  
Findings: A clear causal relationship between reputation and goodwill impairments could not be 
found through this study. There are factors that indicate that there might exist a relationship and 
therefore, this would be a subject that is interesting for further research.  
Further research: There are multiple possibilities for further research on this subject. 
Conducting a similar study but instead using a sample of companies from an English-speaking 
country, using a different proxy for reputation or using multiple proxies are possible studies that 
could be made to add on to this study. Analysing tone in media and its effect on managers 
engaging in earnings management could also result in an interesting study. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This paper aims to examine the relationship between CEO reputation and impairments in 
goodwill. In the accounting field, goodwill is a type of asset that has been under a lot of scrutiny 
historically, this is largely due to the uncertainties associated with the composition and value of 
the asset. The uncertainties come from accounting principles that require estimations based on 
foundations that are often weak. 
All listed companies within the European Union must follow the accounting standards set by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which are called International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The current IFRS accounting standards for goodwill impairment 
were adopted during 2005, and multiple issues have already surfaced. One of those issues with 
the current accounting standards is that they are largely based on subjective estimations and the 
companies will therefore enjoy a high degree of freedom regarding these decisions. This has 
resulted in a lot of companies with ever-growing goodwill posts in their balance sheets. This is 
mainly caused by the fact that impairments that are made are often to small and are taken too late 
(Gauffin & Nilsson, 2013). Essentially, every year each listed company is supposed to evaluate 
whether the value of the asset remains, and if it does not, they must make the necessary write-
downs to reflect the impaired value. Due to the nature of the asset, this evaluation is highly 
subjective and can be subject to unchecked manipulation (Marton, Lundqvist and Pettersson 
2017). Gauffin and Nilsson (2013) write in an article for the accounting journal Balans that the 
average percentage of goodwill that Swedish public companies choose to impair annually is 
below 1%. This means that goodwill will stay on a company’s balance sheet for about 100 years, 
calling into question the relevancy of the asset.  
IASB is currently in the process of revaluating the regulations and figuring out a way to change 
the rules for handling impairments of goodwill for the better. They are also discussing whether to 
increase the amount of information companies are required to disclose regarding business 
combinations and its connection to goodwill. An IASB meeting was held in October 2018, 
discussing a possible change. The plan is to release a discussion paper sometime during the year 
of 2020. The goal is to have the goodwill post more accurately reflect the true value of the asset. 
The proposed change is to revert to the way it was prior to IFRS 3, which was to do yearly write-
offs over a predetermined period, amortisations. (ifrs.org, 2018)  
1.2 Problem Discussion 
As stated earlier, managers enjoy some discretion when it comes to impairment decisions. 
Factors unrelated to accounting standards and actual financial circumstances affect goodwill 
impairment such as CEO tenure (Masters-Stout, Costigan, & Lovata, 2008). There are also many 
other areas where managers are shown to use the discretion that is available to them, not only to 
give benefits to the company but themselves as well (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). In the 
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same way, decisions regarding goodwill is affected factors unrelated to accounting standards, 
earnings management has also shown to be affected by other factors, such as reputation and 
tenure (Ali & Zhang, 2015; Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, & Zang, 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 
2009). 
A CEO's reputation can be seen as a reflection of their ability to run a company from the 
perspective of outside interest. The basis for how good the reputation a specific CEO has, comes 
from how talented the shareholders perceive the individual to be at running the business 
(Milbourn, 2003). A CEO with a better reputation should most likely have a higher degree of 
exposure to different types of media. Since reputation is a function of perceived abilities, more 
reputable CEOs would be working for larger corporations due to their talent. Naturally, larger 
corporations are under more intense scrutiny and monitoring. Monitoring would affect the 
CEO’s ability to make decisions for their personal benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since 
impairment of goodwill could be a tool for the CEO to manage earnings and performance 
indicators, there is a possible link between reputation and goodwill impairment decisions. 
Goodwill is a particularly difficult asset to revalue after its creation and one might imagine that 
goodwill is extra prone to be used as a way to manipulate accounting numbers in a way that is 
favourable to the company’s management. Since the handling of goodwill is associated with 
large discretion, and there is a lack of research examining the relationship between managers 
reputation and their decisions about goodwill impairments it is an interesting subject to further 
investigate.     
1.3 Research Question 
This paper aims to examine how CEO reputation affects decisions regarding impairment of 
goodwill. Intangible assets and goodwill are interesting subjects because companies enjoy 
extended liberty in regard to valuation especially in terms of impairment. It is also interesting to 
study and try to understand motives the CEO may have to act in certain ways, for this paper we 
want to study the CEO’s reputation as a determining factor for impairments in goodwill. The 
research question of this paper is extra relevant at this point in time considering IASB’s proposed 
changes to the regulations regarding goodwill impairments (ifrs.org, 2018). When discussing 
these changes, a deeper understanding of which factors affect managers when they make 
decisions related to goodwill impairments could result in more effective changes to the 
regulations. This paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of the effects of one of these 
factors, reputation.  
There are no previous studies that examine the relationship between reputation and goodwill 
impairments. With this in mind, the central question this paper aims to answer is: Does the 
CEO’s reputation affect decisions about impairment of goodwill?  
Mentions in media is used as proxy for the size of the reputation, the tone of the articles will also 
be checked to see if their reputation is good or bad. This will lead to the secondary research 
question, which tries to examine if a relationship between the tone of the articles and decisions 
about goodwill impairment exists. Our secondary research question will therefore be: Does the 
tone of the media coverage affect the decisions about impairment of goodwill? 
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1.4 Disposition  
The theoretical framework consists of theories and previous research that will be used as the 
basis of the conclusions. The theoretical frameworks start by presenting the current rules and 
regulations on goodwill accounting followed up by theories and previous research relating to, 
earnings management, the media agenda setting theory, agency theory and goodwill 
impairments.  
The research method is the section where the process of conducting this study is explained. It 
describes the process that led to the final sample selection and afterwards explains how the data 
was collected and analysed.  
In the result part an explanation is given on the results from the empirical analysis. The 
important parts from the empirical analysis are highlighted and then explained to give a clear 
image of the results.  
After the results are presented the outcome is discussed with a basis in the theories and previous 
research from the theoretical framework. This part also includes a discussion about what could 
have been done differently.  
The conclusion is the final part of the study and it is here answers to the hypotheses are 
formulated. Examples of possible further research on the subject is also presented. 
2 Theoretical Framework  
2.1 IFRS and Goodwill Regulation 
All the companies included in this research are public companies based in Sweden, the financial 
reporting regulations that they follow is IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). 
IFRS was created by the organisation IASB (International Accounting Standards Board). In 2002 
the EU issued a directive that meant that all public companies in member nations had to start 
following IFRS by 2005. IFRS is required or optional by several other countries outside of the 
EU as well. (Marton et al., 2018) 
IFRS defines an asset as an existing economic resource that the company controls as a result of 
an event occurring. An economic resource is defined as a right that has potential to result in 
economic advantages. An intangible asset is defined as a non-monetary asset without a physical 
shape. Goodwill is an intangible asset but is not covered by the IAS 38 regulations. The reason 
for this is that goodwill can only be acquired through business combinations, which is regulated 
by IFRS 3 business combination. You can have internally created goodwill, but it is not allowed 
to be on the balance sheet, and it cannot be purchased from another company either. This results 
in goodwill being an intangible asset that is not regulated by IAS 38, instead its regulated by 
IFRS 3. (Marton et al., 2018) 
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2.1.1 IFRS 3, Business Combinations 
When acquiring a company, a value must be assigned to all the assets and debts that is acquired. 
The price of the purchase should be split between the different assets that the company have, 
including both tangible and intangible assets. This is usually called purchase price allocation. 
The acquiring company must identify what assets exist and what value each of those assets have. 
(Marton et al., 2018) 
There are some prerequisites for the assets to be recognised. 
●      The asset must be identifiable; this part could be a problem when it come to the 
intangible assets. To be identifiable the asset should either be able to be separated from 
the company or be based on legal rights.   
●      The assets and debts must meet the requirement of the conceptual framework for 
financial reporting.  
●      The asset should be part of the acquisition.  
The assets should be valued to fair value according to IFRS 13 at the time of the acquisition. 
After all the assets and debts have been identified and the consideration have been spread 
between them, the residual value that is left represents the amount of goodwill that comes from 
the acquisition. In other words, goodwill is what is left of the purchase price after you remove 
the net assets (Assets – Debts). (Marton et al., 2018) 
Goodwill is usually explained by either synergy effects that the company gains through the 
acquisitions or by the going concern element. A company that is already operational is worth 
more than a new company that has just started with the same assets. Goodwill can also be 
explained by mistakes made in the acquisition phase, paying too much or valuing assets wrongly 
can also create large posts of goodwill. Since there are no amortisation of goodwill you should 
handle it in the same way as an intangible asset without a decided lifespan, it should be corrected 
by write-downs as soon as the impaired asset is recognised. The impairments should be done 
according to IAS 36. (Marton et al., 2018) 
2.1.2 IAS 36, Impairment of Assets 
A basic perspective in IFRS is that assets should not have a book value higher than the value of 
the future cash flow that the asset can be expected to generate. If the future cash flow decreases, 
then you should reduce the book value of the asset. Estimating the value of the assets can be a 
big problem, especially for intangible assets like goodwill where it is hard to directly connect it 
to future cash flow. Cash flow can either come from selling the asset directly or from using the 
asset as a part of the business, it is the highest of the two that the new value should be based on. 
The future cash flow should be discounted to present value. The estimates become heavily based 
on subjective decisions, which results in a lot of uncertainties in the accounting. Companies 
might decide to over or undervalue the asset to affect the reported results in a way that benefits 
the company. Another way to manipulate the valuation is to choose a discount rate that is too low 
or too high and by doing so changing the size of the cash flow that the asset is expected to 
generate. (Marton et al., 2018) 
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It can often be hard to calculate the cash flow for a single asset, especially when it comes to 
intangible assets. To make this easier the asset is clumped together with other assets to create a 
cash-generating unit. These units should be as small as possible while still generating cash flow 
independent of other assets. Identifying these units is based on subjective assessment, it can 
sometimes be hard to identify a cash-generating unit that is smaller than the company in its 
entirety. Goodwill is an asset that cannot generate cash flow independent from other assets and is 
therefore always part of a cash-generating unit. The goodwill should be assigned to cash-
generating units that benefits from the goodwill directly at the point of acquisition. (Marton et 
al., 2018) 
When doing an impairment test it should be done on the entire cash-generating unit. If the 
goodwill asset is impaired, the impairment should be split between the different assets within the 
unit. If goodwill has been assigned to the cash-generating unit then the entire impairment should 
be taken from the goodwill portion of the unit. Impairments of goodwill can never be reversed. 
As stated previously goodwill should at least once per year undergo a test to see whether the 
book value exceeds future cash flow, if it does you should impair the asset. The test can be done 
anytime during the year, but it must be consistent over the years. Together with this test an 
explanation and justification of why the impairment was recognised or not should be made. This 
is so stakeholders can judge whether the company has made a correct impairment decision. 
When disclosing these explanations, companies must weigh openness against protecting 
company secrets. Impairments should also be recognised if there are signs that the asset has 
decreased in value, even though it is not time for the yearly impairment test. (Marton et al., 
2018) 
 
2.2 Big Bath and Earnings Smoothing 
There are at least two types of motives for writing down impaired assets that are not directly 
related to the true value of the asset in question. The first of which is income smoothing. Income 
smoothing is the practise of writing down assets in times when the firm is performing higher than 
usual profit. By writing down impaired assets during these financial years creates a smoother net 
income over years which is thought to signal a lower risk in the company’s performance. The 
lower risk will make the shares and bonds more attractive to investors. (Zucca & Campbell, 
1992) 
The second phenomenon is what is called the “Big Bath”. The big bath is when the company 
choose to write down impaired assets at the end of a period of lower than usual performance, it is 
done to signal that the bad times have come to an end and that brighter times are laying ahead. 
(Zucca & Campbell, 1992) 
Studies have shown that managers may choose to overstate impairment losses when taking big 
baths or income smoothing. There is also evidence that managers are keener on taking big baths 
during the first financial year of their tenure. The lower earnings may then be blamed on the old 
management and additionally the future performance indicators will be more favourable to the 
new management. The big bath can also have an alternative explanation that puts the new 
management in more favourable light. The old management may have been reluctant to write 
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down assets as it would reflect on their poor management that led to the impairment. The write 
down that is made by the new management in this case may very well just be a reflection of true 
asset values. (Abughazaleh, Al-Hares, & Roberts, 2011) 
Studies have illustrated that CEO tenure is a factor that affects write-downs in goodwill and that 
CEOs tend to utilise the big bath early in their tenure (Masters-Stout et al., 2008). A reasonable 
conclusion based on that premise is that the CEO has at least some interest in managing 
impairments other than to reflect fair value. There is strong evidence that new CEOs impair more 
than their predecessor, specifically, new CEOs make more impairments in the first two years 
(Masters-Stout et al., 2008).  
2.3 Media Agenda Setting Theory 
The media agenda setting theory discusses how the media affects and shape the public opinion. 
An experiment was conducted during the 1968 presidential campaign in USA where McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) compared what people in a certain city believed to be the key issues discussed 
in the campaign, and what issue the media covered the most. The theory states that if the media 
covers a certain subject a lot, the public opinion about this subject will change to regard it as 
something very important. According to the theory, media is not a reflection of what is 
important, instead the media shapes what the public regard as important. This turned out to be 
true in regard to the experiment with the presidential campaign, there was a strong relationship 
between the public opinion and what media reported. They also discovered that the effect of 
media was bigger on people that had little interest in politics and little knowledge about politics. 
They tended to be more likely to base what they thought was the most important issue on 
something they had heard or read from a media source in the last twenty-four hours. People with 
more personal experience and better knowledge about the subject turned out to be more likely to 
use that as a basis for their opinions, and less likely to be influenced by mass media. (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972) 
The Agenda setting theory has had a large spread and because of this the original theory has 
evolved. The media agenda setting theory now states that the media not only influence what to 
think about, but also how to think about it. How things are communicated by the media affects 
what type of agenda is connected to it, how important is it? what should your opinion about the 
subject be? News coverage can do a lot more than just influence the opinions of people; it has 
shown to be able to predict how these opinions are going to change. (McCombs & Shaw, 1993)  
Although the first experiment was based on the world of politics it has been transferred and is 
now used extensively in other fields of research. An example of research done by using the 
media agenda setting theory is Brown and Deegan (1998) who use it as one of the foundations in 
their research to explain companies’ decisions regarding their disclosure of environmental 
performance. They used the ABIX (Australian business index) database to find articles, after that 
they searched the articles for certain environmental related keywords, the articles then got sorted 
in to positive and negative articles. They did this twice first to find the industries that would be 
included and then they did it again for specific companies by doing the word analysis on their 
annual report. They found that if a company has a lot of negative media coverage regarding their 
environmental work, they will have a higher degree of positive environmental disclosure. They 
chose to give information to counteract the negative media attention. (Brown & Deegan, 1998) 
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When CEOs attain large enough reputations, they can be considered celebrity CEOs and the 
expectation that stakeholders have on them will change. Media is the biggest factor in creating 
these celebrity CEOs, journalists tend to give the CEO credit for everything that goes right for 
the company. This increase in reputation can also create CEOs with overconfidence, which could 
result in a change in behaviour (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004). Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) found that CEOs with overconfidence and hubris are more likely to pay large premiums 
when acquiring a business, CEOs that were praised more in media were shown to pay larger 
premiums. Paying a premium when acquiring a company will result in a larger amount of 
goodwill, if the goodwill does not reflect the fair value of the asset the asset should be impaired 
(Marton, Lundqvist, & Pettersson, 2018).  
2.4 Agency Theory 
Agency theory discusses the situation and problems that may occur when two parties have 
differing goals or when it is hard for one party to monitor what the other party is doing. Agency 
theory examines the relationship between a principle and an agent, the identity of the principle 
and agent can vary. Agency theory can be used in a lot of different contexts and with a change in 
context the identity of the agent and principle changes. The principle often takes the role of a 
company owner and the CEO becomes the agent. In the owner/CEO relationship, the owner 
would be considered to be the principal and the CEO would be considered to be the agent. Their 
relationship is usually explained and controlled by creating a contract between the two parties. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
There are several problems that can arise in the principal and agent relationship, one of which is 
that they might be working towards different goals, another being that they may have different 
risk preferences. A critical assumption in the principal/agent theory is that people are acting in 
self-interest, they will act in a way that generates the biggest benefits to themselves. The self-
interest assumption is connected to the agent’s behaviour and it may cause them to act in a way 
that hurts the principle. The principle tries to limit these behaviours by forming contracts 
between the two parties in an attempt to align their goals. Contracts are based on either outcome 
or on controlling the agent’s behaviour. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
A common way to align the goals is to make the manager a part owner in the company through 
stock compensation. Another method to control opportunism is by using information systems, 
increasing the monitoring of the agent makes it harder for them to deceive the principle and 
makes it easier for the principle to control the agent. This should force the agent to work in a way 
that the principle desire. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
Much of the research that connects agency theory with reputation focus on how a higher degree 
of monitoring, which comes with a better reputation, affect the agent’s decisions. Fama (1980) 
states that there are incentives for managers to act in a way that gives them the highest 
compensation in line with the agency theory. He also claims that these incentives are 
counteracted by other factors, which result in managers who does not need to engage in any type 
of earnings management. Future wages expected to be generated by the manager, will be 
recalculated based on information from the past and present. If managers act in a way that lowers 
the quality of the reports it will damage their reputation and therefore lower their future wages, 
this damage will also carry over to other companies. This process is called the “Wage revision 
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process” and it will supposedly negate any incentives that managers may have to act 
opportunistic. Reputed managers will have more to lose in the form of damaged human capital 
and future earnings and will therefore be less likely to act in an opportunistic way. (Fama, 1980) 
Fama’s research is in line with what the agency theory claims will happen when increased 
monitoring is applied to the agent. 
2.5 Hypothesis development 
Reputation is seen by stakeholders as an important indication of the quality of the financial 
reports since CEO’s with better reputation are expected to deliver financial reports of a higher 
quality. However, research has shown that this is not always the case. In the research paper 
“CEO reputation and earnings quality”, (Francis et al., 2008) found that CEOs with a better 
reputation were more likely to manage their earnings and manipulate them in a way to suit the 
company and themselves. 
According to a survey, 78% of managers use earnings smoothing to create better financial 
reports, and 55% would turn down projects with positive NPV, if accepting the project would 
result in not reaching the periods target goals (Graham et al., 2005). The reason they decide to 
manipulate the earnings is partly to receive short term compensation tied to reaching the goals, 
but mainly it was tied to trying to improve their career. Reaching the goals would improve their 
career while not reaching them would have a negative effect and possibly result in losing their 
job. Their career is connected with their external reputation, 75% of the manager stated that 
external reputation was a major explanation in why they engaged in earnings management 
(Graham et al., 2005). If managers manipulate the financial reports to maintain or improve their 
reputation, an assumption could be made that managers with good reputations are likely to be 
using some sort of earnings management. 
An explanation to why CEO’s with higher reputation are likely to engage in earnings 
management is that stakeholders have higher expectations of them. The expectations usually 
come from the fact that the CEO performed very well in the past and gained status and reputation 
because of that. The performance is then expected to continue or even improve further in the 
future. These expectations can often become so high that the manager cannot reach them and 
then has to resort to manipulating the numbers to reach the desired level. They also tend to use 
their higher status as a way to increase their compensation. Managers not reaching their goals 
could face damage to their reputation and with that hurt their career and lower the compensation 
that they can request from the company. Thus they have high incentives to manipulate the 
numbers to create a positive image of their performance. (Malmendier & Tate, 2009) 
According to both Fama (1980) and Malmendier and Tate (2009), managers will act in a way 
that gives them the highest compensation and they seem to be more interested in long term 
boosts to their reputation over short term incentives. They disagree on how the manager chose to 
act to obtain these benefits. According to Malmendier and Tate (2009), managers boosts their 
reputation by using earnings management or other methods to give an impression of better 
performance. Fama (1980) states the opposite, reputed managers do not engage in those activities 
because they do not want to risk causing damage to their reputation. There are conflicting 
predictions about how managers will behave which makes this an interesting subject for further 
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examination. Goodwill is especially interesting since less research has been done on goodwill 
and its relationship with reputation compared to earnings management.  
The following two null hypotheses has been formulated to test the relationship between CEO 
reputation and impairment decisions. The hypotheses have been formulated to test the 
relationship for both the size of the reputation as well as whether the CEO has a good or bad 
reputation.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1) - Impairment decisions are not affected by the CEO’s presence in media 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) - Impairment decisions are not affected by the sentiment of the media 
coverage of the CEO 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample Selection 
When selecting companies to include in the study, the data had to meet several criteria to be 
suitable for comparative statistical analysis. The data was collected and filtered in stages to 
create datasets to use for different test within the research.  
First, the sample was limited to Swedish public companies listed on Nasdaq Stockholm to make 
sure that all the companies included follow the same accounting standards, IFRS, and to make 
sure that these companies have plenty of stakeholders which in turn generates media coverage. 
Financial companies were removed since they differ in important aspects and follow a different 
set of accounting rules than other companies. This created our first sample which consisted of 
367 companies. 
Second, companies that did not have reported goodwill in every year between 2013 and 2017 
was excluded. This decision was to make sure that all the companies had the variables that was 
used in the statistical analysis for every given year. It also served the purpose of removing 
companies that went bankrupt during the period as well as companies that were founded after the 
start of the period. These filters were applied, the sample consisted of 179 companies. Data from 
these companies were collected for each of the five years, resulting in a total sample size of 895 
observations. This sample was used for testing the first hypothesis, H1.  
Third, to create a sample that could be used to test the second hypothesis, H2, the H1 sample was 
reduced further. Not all CEOs were mentioned in English written media and therefore could not 
be included in the tone analysis of the media coverage and had to be removed. This reduced the 
sample size to 724 and resulted in the third sample that was used to answer the second 
hypothesis, H2.  
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Sample selection 
Change in 
sample 
Sample size 
First sample, only Swedish companies and 
removal of financial companies. 
  367 
      
Second sample, removing companies that did not 
have reported goodwill. 
-188 179 
      
Using the sample for five years. 716 895 
      
Third sample, removing companies not mentioned 
in English media. 
-169 726 
Figure 3,1, Sample selection 
3.2 Data Collection 
The data collection began with collecting the relevant company information that could be found 
in the companies’ financial reports. This data was gathered by using the Capital IQ database and 
was collected for each of the five years for all 367 companies. This data was collected first so 
that the companies that did not have goodwill could be eliminated before further data collection 
was made. The data that were collected through the Capital IQ database were both information 
from financial reports and information regarding the CEO. 
A core part of this research is based on the reputation of the CEO. Reputation is not a numerical 
value and cannot be specified and therefore, a proxy must be found. The proxy that was decided 
upon was the number of times the CEO is mentioned in print media. The same proxy for 
reputation has been used by previous research papers such as Milbourn (2003) and Francis et al. 
(2008). 
This data was collected from Factiva, a database by Dow Jones that delivers business data 
gathered from sources like newspaper, journals, radio and many other types of news channels. 
The data was collected for each year during the period 2013-2017, it allowed comparison of how 
much coverage each company got during a specific year and compare that with the decisions 
about goodwill impairments that were made during the same period. The data collected from 
Factiva was also filtered to not include articles about companies that mentioned another 
company’s CEO. Only articles that directly mentioned the CEO in connection with the company 
that they work for were used. Communication that originates from the company were also 
excluded since that cannot reasonable be considered an expression of reputation.  
  
 
 
14 
Factiva requires manual data collection and much of the data regarding CEOs had to be collected 
manually as well, this was because Capital IQ could only provide part of the information about 
the CEO. Information such as who the CEO was during different periods and length of CEO 
tenure had to be collected manually, it was collected by looking at financial reports, press 
releases and company websites.  
3.3 DICTION – Text Analysis 
Quantitative content analysis is useful when the volume of materials is so large that examining it 
through qualitative methods is practically impossible. Using quantitative measures to analyse 
texts will also create a study that is more objective and reproducible (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). 
The text analysis was done in a similar way to what (Brown & Deegan, 1998) did in their 
research, i.e. by counting the number of mentions of a set of different keywords. Although, this 
paper used different sources for its articles and the text analysis software; DICTION, was used to 
do the text analysis. The purpose of using DICTION was to determine whether the sentiment of 
the articles during a year were positive or negative. One important limitation with DICTION is 
that it can only analyse English texts, therefore only a portion of the gathered material could be 
used in this process. A small portion of the companies did not have any media coverage in 
English and therefore these companies could not be part of the text analysis part of the study. 
Assumptions was drawn from the DICTION analysis whether the CEO has a good or bad 
reputation. Considering that only English text can be analysed with DICTION, some conclusions 
based on this sample might not fully reflect the sentiment in all media. Foreign writers may have 
a different perspective than Swedish writers when writing about Swedish CEOs, which is 
something that might weaken some of the conclusions in the analysis. 
DICTION has many different master variables that can be used as a basis for the analysis. The 
one that fits best for this paper’s analysis was “Optimism”, which is defined by DICTION as,  
“Language endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive 
entailments”. 
Optimism is the best fit because it contains vocabularies that indicate good or poor faith in the 
CEO and therefore can be said to reflect the CEO’s good or bad reputation. All the master 
variables consist of multiple minor variables, both positive and negative. Each of the minor 
variables consists of smaller categories of wordlists. The text analysis works by giving a score 
for every minor variable based on the amount of times the specific words are used in the text. 
The master variable is then calculated by the following formula: 
“[Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] – [Blame + Hardship + Denial] 
After the formula a constant of 50 is added to convert the range of scores into all-positive values. 
DICTION standardises the result against their own database of texts to make the score useful for 
comparison with each other. The data collected from the DICTION analysis was then merged 
with data collected from Capital IQ to be used for statistical analysis in Stata, a statistical 
analysis software. 
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis was the last part of the data analysis and was done to get answers to our 
null hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 - Impairment decisions are not affected by the CEO’s presence in media 
Hypothesis 2 – Impairment decisions are not affected by the sentiment of the media coverage of 
the CEO 
3.4.1 Variables 
The first step of the statistical analysis was to create all the variables that would be necessary to 
run the tests.  
gwimpairment = goodwill impairment. This variable is our dependent variable and takes the form 
of a binary dummy variable. In other words, the test only checks if a company makes an 
impairment or not, it does not check for the size of the impairment. Therefore, the variable takes 
the value of “1” if the company made an impairment in that year and “0” otherwise. 
Total = Total number of hits in media. This includes both Swedish and English media coverage. 
This variable is a proxy for reputation and is our main independent variable for testing H1. This 
variable has been used previously when examining reputation, Milbourn (2003) and Francis et al. 
(2008) are two examples of previous people who have used it.  
Optimism = Optimism score is a proxy for the quality of the CEOs reputation and is used to 
explain if the person has a good or bad reputation. This is the main independent variable for 
testing H2. 
Logta = logarithmic value of total assets. An independent variable that controls for the size of the 
company and how that factor affects decisions regarding goodwill impairments. Total asset is a 
common variable that is used by many to control for company size, an example of it being used 
is by Malmendier & Tate (2009) in their study on CEO reputation. Total asset is shown by 
Malmendier & Tate (2009) to have a correlation with reputation and is therefore important to 
include as a control variable.  
Wroa = winsorised return on total assets. An independent variable that controls for company 
performance. Return on total assets is calculated as net income / total assets. The variable has 
been winsorised at a 1% level which mean that outliers and extreme variables have been limited 
to decrease their effect on the regression analysis.  
Lev = company leverage. An independent variable that checks the company’s debt situation. 
Calculated as (long term debt + Short term debt)/total equity. The debt situation can be a big 
factor in decisions about goodwill impairments considering doing an impairment will lower your 
total equity and result in a bigger leverage.  
Gwta = Goodwill/total assets. An independent variable that puts the company’s goodwill in 
relation to their size. This variable creates a better comparison between different companies 
when you compare what percentage of total assets consists of goodwill instead of comparing the 
total amount of goodwill.  
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Tenure = CEO tenure. An independent variable which measures how long the CEO has held the 
position of CEO at the specific company and examines how this affects their behaviour regarding 
goodwill impairments.  
Year = Year of which the data comes from. An independent variable that tries to control for the 
years effect on the dependent variable. There might exist a pattern where more goodwill 
impairments were made during a certain year.  
Industry = which industry the company is in. An independent variable that controls for if the 
industry that the company works in influences the dependent variable. Certain industries might 
be more likely to do goodwill impairments  
3.4.2 Statistical Tests 
The first tests that were performed were correlation tests for the different variables, both a 
Pearson and a Spearman analysis were made to test for correlation. The Pearson test measures 
linear relationships and the Spearman test measures monotonic relationship. This was done to see 
if there were any variables that were too strongly correlated with each other, and so possible 
correlations between variables could be considered when looking at the results from the 
regression models.  
After the correlation test, a two-sample z-test was done to test the variables gwimpairment and 
optimism, the purpose of this test was to see if there exists a difference in the mean optimism 
score between the samples that did goodwill impairments and the ones that did not. This test was 
performed with a 95% confidence interval.  
 
The final tests of the statistical analysis were multiple regression models done with different 
variables. These were done to test both H1 and H2. Firstly, the regression model was performed 
with only the dependent variable and the main independent variable. The purpose was to see the 
effects of the main independent variable before controlling with other independent variables.  
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  ε 
After this, independent variables were added one by one to see the how the other independent 
variables affect the dependent variable and to see how these additions changed the result of the 
regression models. Adding most of the other independent variables resulted in this formula for 
the regression model: 
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑤𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  ε 
Finally, the year and industry were controlled for to see if it had any effect on the decision about 
goodwill impairment. The final formula became: 
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑤𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽7𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝛽8𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ε 
The previous formula and method were for testing H1. H2 was tested in the same way with 
minor changes to the formula, the variable total was changed to optimism. The three formulas for 
testing H2 were the following: 
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𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 +  ε 
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑤𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  ε 
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽3𝑤𝑟𝑜𝑎 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽5𝑔𝑤𝑡𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽7𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝛽8𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ε 
All the regression formulas were tested at a confidence level of 90%, 95% and 99%. 
It was also decided to do multiple regression models testing for the different minor variables 
included in the optimism variable, this was done by replacing optimism with the different minor 
variables. This was to see if a specific minor variable had a strong impact on the decision 
regarding goodwill impairments, and to see if positive and negative minor variables have 
different effects on the dependent variable. 
4 Results 
Firstly, descriptive data on the different variables that will be used for the regression models is 
presented.  
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Wroa 894     .0459356     .0865052 .4007117    .2712348   
LogTA 894 8.111434 1.902571 3.416414 12.92998   
d_gwimpairment 897      .1337793     .3406049           0 1   
Tenure 892     6.603139     7.255596           0     40   
Leverage 894 .6493198 2.073573 -12.00127 30.22619   
Total 892 44.83072 78.61725 0  841  
Figure 4.1, Descriptive test of variables used in regression models.  
Wroa and LogTA have been used instead of return on assets and total assets to get variables that 
will be easier to use in a regression model. The mean on the dummy variable d_gwimpairment is 
at roughly 0,13 which indicates that quite few of the companies impair their goodwill assets.  
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To get an idea of which of the control variables might correlate with each other, the table below 
shows the pairwise correlation between them all.  
  Wroa LogTA GwTA Tenure Leverage Total 
Wroa 1           
LogTA 0.1663* 1         
GwTA -0.1265* -0.0810* 1       
Tenure 0.2010* 0.0113 0.0019 1     
Leverage -0.0578 0.1371* 0.0235 -0.0315 1   
Total 0.0663 0.5687* -0.1113 -0.0671 -0.0212 1 
Figure 4,2, pairwise correlation test between all the variables.  
The stars indicate a 5% significance on the pairwise correlation. LogTA correlates significantly 
with most of the variables, which is something to keep in mind for the upcoming analysis. 
Respectively, tenure correlates with only return on assets (Wroa).  
 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Looking at the first hypothesis, that the total number of articles written about the CEO and 
company will affect goodwill impairment decision. The dummy variable that contains either 
impairment or no impairment was created to make an analysis if the media presence affects 
whether or not a company will make goodwill impairments.  
 
Figure 4,3, Regression analysis with d_gwimpairment as the dependent variable and total as the independent 
variable.  
The outcome displayed in the table shows that there is a statistically significant correlation 
between the dummy variable of goodwill impairments and total articles written about the CEO 
and the company at a 5% significance level.  
Post-estimation of the probability of goodwill impairments at a given number with confidence 
intervals is illustrated in the graph below.   
 
d_gwimpairments Coef. Std. Err. z P>/z/ 
Total no. articles 0.0012111 0.0005985 2.02 0.043 
Intercept -1.180544 0.0615026 -19.2 0 
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Figure 4,4, Diagram showing the marginal effects on d_gwimpairment when total increases.  
 
The probability that a company makes impairment in goodwill increases from 11.1% to 17.4% 
when mentions in media increases from 0 to 200.  
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  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  b/z  b/z b/z b/z 
d_gwimpairment          
total 0.001**  0.001** 0 0.001 
  -2.14  -2.25 (-0.52) -0.96 
Intercept -1.181***  -0.992*** -1.909*** -1.382*** 
  (-19.78)  (-8.98) (-7.05) (-3.17) 
Wroa    -2.011*** -2.589*** -2.449*** 
     (-3.46) (-4.11) (-3.83) 
lev    -0.023 -0.053** -0.073** 
     (-1.27) (-1.98) (-2.02) 
gwta    0.064 0.134 0.397 
     -0.21 -0.45 -1.2 
Tenure    -0.020** -0.020** -0.017* 
     (-2.22) (-2.23) (-1.93) 
logTA      0.123*** 0.070* 
       -3.59 -1.92 
Year effects  No  No No Yes 
Industry effects  No  No No Yes 
           
Adj. R-6          
N 892  890 890 890 
Figure 4,5, Multiple regression analysis with d_gwimpairment as the dependent variable and total as main 
independent variable.  
What can be seen in the table above is that total articles lost its significance when other variables 
were controlled for. Furthermore, the industry and year variables does not seem to have a 
significant correlation with goodwill impairments. When the same test was done without 
controlling for logta, the total articles variable regains its significance to P>z = 0.02. When 
controlling only for logta, the same relation was found. What this means is that total articles 
written correlate to the company’s total assets which in turn also correlates to impairment. 
Significance is still there when controlled for everything except logta.  
The table shows that tenure is significant at a 10% after controlling for year and industry effects. 
Tenure has a negative relationship with goodwill impairments meaning that the longer tenure a 
CEO has the less likely they are to make a goodwill impairment.  
H1 - Impairment decisions are not affected by the CEO’s presence in media 
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The hypothesis cannot be rejected based on these results. This study shows that the significance 
level does not reach the 10% level when controlling for other factors and can therefore not 
support a claim that reputation is a factor that affects CEOs in their decisions regarding goodwill 
impairments.  
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Optimism 726 50.33101 1.276041 43.94 55.31 
Figure 4,6, Test on the sample size.  
The text analysis produced one score for every company and year that was based on the English 
language media articles that were collected. An analysis of all the scores showed that the mean 
score was 50.33 in a range of possible values of 0-100. A value of 50 would indicate that the 
sample in question is completely neutral in terms of optimism. The minimum value in the dataset 
was 43.94 and the maximum was 55.31 as the table indicates. The scores indicate that most of 
the observations contain language that on average is neutral and the minimum and maximum 
values are fairly close to the mean.  
Z-Test       
Group Obs. Mean Std. Err. 
0 622 50.33426 0.0528065 
1 104 50.31154 0.0982275 
combined 726 50.33101 0.0473583 
diff   0.0227221 1.276041 
H0: diff = 0   z = 0.1680   
Figure 4,7, z-test comparing optimism between those that makes impairments and those that does not.  
The table above illustrates that the mean difference between having goodwill impairments and 
not, as represented by 1 and 0 respectively, is 0.023 which would be considered small. The 
difference is not statistically significant meaning that the existence of a difference between the 
means cannot be proven. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sentiment of media reporting has 
any effect on goodwill impairment decisions. 
The regression analysis that was made with goodwill impairment dummy variable also showed 
that optimism does not affect goodwill impairments significantly. In the table below, the values 
for that regression analysis is displayed. The P-value for the optimism variable is 0.89, not close 
to any levels of significance. 
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 Coefficients   
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
  b/z b/z b/z 
d_gwimpairment       
Optimism -0.008 0.005 -0.007 
  (-0.21) -0.14 (-0.17) 
Intercept -0.659 -1.892 -0.762 
  (-0.33) (-0.95) (-0.37) 
logta   0.087*** 0.045 
    -2.63 -1.27 
Wroa   -2.378*** -2.178*** 
    (-3.39) (-3.09) 
Lev   -0.048* -0.069* 
    (-1.70) (-1.85) 
Gwta   0.219 0.472 
    -0.69 -1.33 
Tenure   -0.020** -0.014 
    (-2.08) (-1.58) 
Year effects  No No Yes 
Industry effects  No No Yes 
N 726 723 723 
Figure 4,8, Multiple regression analysis with d_gwimpairment as dependent variable and optimism as the main 
independent variable. 
The vocabularies included in the optimism variable that was tested in DICTION were also 
individually tested. 4 out of 6 variables showed no significant correlation, whereas denial had a 
significant negative correlation at the 5% significance level and praise had a negative correlation 
at the 10% significance level. 
 
Descriptive statistics: Denial   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denial 726 3.936942 2.994428 0 28.28 
Figure 4.9, summarised statistics of the Denial variable 
An analysis of all the scores showed that the mean score was 3.94. A value of 0 would indicate 
that the sample in question is completely lack words from the denial vocabulary. The minimum 
value in the dataset was 0 and the maximum was 28.28 as the table indicates. The scores indicate 
that most of the observations contain language that on average is quite neutral and the minimum 
value is fairly close to the mean.  
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  Model1 Model2 Model3 
  b/z b/z b/z 
d_gwimpairment       
Denial -0.041* -0.044** -0.050** 
  (-1.94) (-2.12) (-2.40) 
Intercept -0.912*** -1.499*** -0.947** 
  (-9.43) (-4.92) (-1.99) 
Logta   0.091*** 0.049 
    -2.72 -1.37 
Wroa   -2.419*** -2.262*** 
    (-3.41) (-3.17) 
Lev   -0.047 -0.067* 
    (-1.62) (-1.79) 
Gwta   0.244 0.493 
    -0.76 -1.38 
Tenure   -0.020** -0.015* 
    (-2.13) (-1.65) 
Year effects  No No Yes 
Industry effects  No No Yes 
N 726 723 723 
Figure 4,10, Multiple regression analysis with d_gwimpairment as dependent variable and Denial as main 
independent variable. 
The regression model shows that denial is a variable that has a relationship with goodwill 
impairments. The relationship reaches a significance level of 5% when controlling for other 
factors. This means that articles that include a lot of the denial words in its content has a negative 
relationship with goodwill impairments.  
 
Descriptive statistics: Denial   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Denial 726 3.936942 2.994428 0 28.28 
Figure 4.10, summarised statistics of the Denial variable 
An analysis of all the scores showed that the mean score was 3.94. A value of 0 would indicate 
that the sample in question is completely lack words from the denial vocabulary. The minimum 
value in the dataset was 0 and the maximum was 28.28 as the table indicates. The scores indicate 
that most of the observations contain language that on average is quite neutral and the minimum 
value is fairly close to the mean.  
 
  
 
 
24 
 
Figure 4.11, Marginal effect of the Denial variable on the d_Gwimpairment variable.  
The probability that a company makes impairment in goodwill decreases from 18.2% to 1.2% 
when the denial score increases from 0 to 30.  
5 Analysis 
5.1 Discussion Hypothesis 1 
The first regression analysis that checked for a relationship between goodwill impairments and 
reputation, shows that the correlation is significant at a 5% level. This relationship is similar to 
what Malmendier and Tate (2009) and Graham et al. (2005) have shown to exist between 
reputation and earnings management. They claim that managers with better reputation are more 
likely to engage in earnings management.  For this study the relationship indicates that managers 
with better reputation are less likely to do goodwill impairments. This goes against the result 
from Fama’s (1980) study that claims the opposite, reputed CEOs will refrain from engaging in 
earnings management.  
When the regression model was expanded to also include multiple control variables the 
relationship was not as clear. The relationship was significant until logta was controlled for. A 
problem with adding logta is that it correlates quite strongly with reputation, which is why it has 
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such a large impact when it comes to the regression analysis. This correlation can be seen in 
different ways, they correlate because large companies hire CEOs with a big reputation or, larger 
companies tend to have a larger media presence and since media presence is the proxy for 
reputation this will result in a correlation. In reality it is probably a combination of both which 
would explain why the correlation between the two variables had a moderate coefficient at 0,568. 
Other studies that use media presence as a proxy for reputation, like Francis et al. (2008), also 
has a high correlation between total assets and reputation but not as strongly correlated as in this 
study. Some of the other studies like Milbourn (2003) use alternative proxies to show company 
size, these proxies seem to not show the same correlation with reputation as total assets does, and 
therefore they do not encounter the same problems. 
The regression analysis showed that tenure have a negative correlation with impairments in 
goodwill, although only with a 10% significance level, meaning that CEOs make more 
impairments in the beginning of their tenure. This pattern is consistent with big bath theory that 
says managers make more impairments early in their tenure to, amongst other things, signal the 
start of new times and improve performance indicators for future financial years (Abughazaleh et 
al., 2011). Tenure have in other studies been used together with other variables as a proxy for 
reputation (Milbourn, 2003). This could indicate a relationship between reputation and 
impairment decisions that could not be proven in this study, opening up for further examination 
within this topic. The regression analysis showed that tenure have a negative correlation with 
impairments in goodwill, although only with a 10% significance level, meaning that CEOs make 
more impairments in the beginning of their tenure. This pattern is consistent with big bath theory 
that says managers make more impairments early in their tenure to, amongst other things, signal 
the start of new times and improve performance indicators for future financial years (Zucca & 
Campbell, 1992). Tenure have in other studies been used together with other variables as a proxy 
for reputation (Milbourn, 2003). This could indicate a relationship between reputation and 
impairment decisions that could not be proven in this study, opening up for further examination 
within this topic.  
There are methods that could be used to try to show a relationship between goodwill 
impairments and reputation, while at the same time trying to limit the effects that company size 
will have on the test. Finding another reliable proxy could make it possible to get a clear result 
from the test. With more possible proxies the test could also be made by testing multiple proxies 
at the same time. The problem that arises from using multiple proxies is that it would require 
more time to be able to gather all the extra data to perform the analysis. 
5.2 Discussion Hypothesis  
This study’s statistical analysis could not prove that the optimism variable that was used to 
analyse the articles, correlate or affect the goodwill impairment decisions of those companies. 
There is however, one variable that denotes the tone of the articles that is significant at a 5% 
significance level; denial. The correlation between goodwill impairment and denial is negative, 
meaning that a higher level of denial in the media coverage decreases the probability that 
goodwill impairments will be made. Worse reputation in terms of denial will lower the amount 
of goodwill impairments being made. 
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If a company has a lot of negative press, they will try to act in a certain way to mitigate the 
negative press that they receive. The reason is to save the reputation of the company or manager, 
this is extra important considering media's ability to influence people’s opinion as shown by the 
media agenda setting theory (Brown & Deegan, 1998). From an accounting perspective, not 
making impairments when you should, is seen as something negative. The media agenda setting 
theory is based on the public’s opinion, and the public usually does not react negatively to the 
absence of impairments but instead react negatively to impairments being made. This can be 
seen as there is a relationship between announcements of planned goodwill impairments and a 
decrease in market value (Li, Amel-Zadeh, & Meeks, 2010). This reaction is visible when 
looking at the effects of an increase in the denial factor, an increase will result in the companies 
being less likely to make goodwill impairments. One explanation to why this relationship exists 
could be that companies try to minimize the bad press by not acting in ways that would generate 
additional bad news, therefore they refrain from doing impairments. Even though denial is the 
only factor that is significant at a 5% level, all the negative factors have a higher significance 
level than the optimism variable as a whole. One possible explanation to why only denial is 
significant, could be because the other variables is based on negative words that might not be 
used as often when it comes to business articles. Denial is based on more commonly used 
negative words such as don’t, shouldn’t, won’t etc. Explanations for the variables and examples 
of words can be found in the appendix.  
Denial has shown to have a negative relationship with goodwill impairments which indicate 
worse reputation or more bad press will result in a lower amount of goodwill impairments, the 
same relationship exists with the word list praise, more positive press in the terms of praise will 
also lead to a lower amount of goodwill impairments. This causes a contradiction considering 
both positive press in terms of praise and negative press in terms of denial will according to the 
results lead to a lower amount of goodwill impairments. The negative word lists do have a 
stronger effect on the impairments than the positive word lists.  
An explanation to why a higher praise leads to less goodwill could be found in the research on 
earnings management. Many managers engage in earnings management in an attempt to improve 
the bottom line and thereby increase their reputation (Graham et al., 2005). As mentioned above, 
doing goodwill impairments are generally considered as something negative and therefore could 
cause damage to the managers reputation (Li et al., 2010). CEOs who are engaging in different 
types of earnings management or refraining from doing goodwill impairments could gain praise 
from the media by showing a better result. This could be a possible explanation for the negative 
relationship between praise and goodwill impairments.  
The analysis may have shown other results if companies in English speaking countries was 
examined since diction only could be used on English articles. The articles written about 
Swedish listed companies in English may generally be of the more informative kind and the 
correlation this paper was set out to find may be prevalent only when looking at texts that more 
resemble opinion pieces. Another explanation may be that there simply is not enough written in 
media about Swedish listed companies in general. If the test was done on only the largest 
companies in Sweden, we may have seen a different result. However, since Sweden is a 
relatively small country, the companies that are big enough to be mentioned in such a large scale 
may be too few to find statistical results that are significant.   
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6 Conclusion 
The first hypothesis – impairment decisions are not affected by the CEO’s presence in media – 
was concluded that there is indeed a correlation between the number of mentions in media and 
goodwill impairment decisions. However, mentions in media is unlikely to be causal in this 
context since the effect disappears when controlled for the value of total assets. Considering that 
CEOs with longer tenure tend to make less impairments, and tenure as previously been used as a 
proxy for reputation in other studies, there are still indications that reputation has an effect on 
goodwill impairments, and it could be relevant to conduct further research on this subject. 
The second hypothesis – Impairment decisions are not affected by the sentiment of the media 
coverage of the CEO – could neither be rejected nor supported by this study. Meaning that it 
cannot be proven that impairment decisions are affected by the sentiment of the media coverage 
of the CEO. Although, when looking at factors such as denial and praise, there are indications 
that the tone in media has an effect on managers, on this subject there is room to make a more in-
depth study to further examine the correlation.   
What are the implications of this study? The study shows that the reputation of the CEO in media 
can affect a CEO’s decisions towards making or not making goodwill impairments. This new 
insight could possibly be used by investors to predict the behaviour of the CEO and in turn get an 
indication of how the company is going to act in the regard of goodwill. Focusing on reputation 
and the tone in articles, this study also contributes to a better understanding of the factors that 
affect CEOs when making goodwill impairment decisions. Getting a deeper understanding of the 
underlying motives to why goodwill impairments are made is extra important at this point in 
time considering IASB and their proposed change to the regulation. 
7. Further Research 
Reputation and its effect on goodwill is a subject that has the potential for further research, as 
mentioned previously in this study, there is a number of things that could be done differently to 
get different results from this study. Conducting similar research but instead using samples 
consisting of companies from English speaking countries and have a higher number of large 
companies could possibly generate a different result. It would also result in studies with larger 
samples, both in terms of the number of companies but also in the number of English written 
articles that are written about each of those companies. The type of article that is written may 
also be a factor when doing word analysis, and since only english articles could be used in 
DICTION english speaking countries would have a large variety in types of articles. Another 
option is to conduct a study with the use of multiple proxies for reputation, this could possibly 
lead to other conclusions regarding the effects of reputation on goodwill impairments. There are 
multiple options to further build on this study and by doing so, create a more in-depth 
understanding of reputation and its effect on goodwill impairments in the process. 
Using reputation and seeing how it affects managers in their decisions about things other than 
goodwill could also be very interesting, and it is an area with many possibilities for further study. 
Looking into how the tone in media effects managers decisions when it comes to earnings 
management could also be a very interesting topic to research.  
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9. Appendices 
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9.2 Appendix 2: List of companies in sample
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